point was awarded whenever the subject managed to hit the target. In all other cases no points 23 were awarded. The total point score was displayed on the screen at all times. Even though we 24 found stronger significance in the urn task and weaker significance in the motor task for specific 25 ambiguity levels, overall we found that our results were not significantly affected when comparing 26 the subject population receiving force payoff to the subject population receiving point payoffs 27 (p > 0.15, Wilcoxon ranksum test for each ambiguity condition in the urn task and p > 0.5, 28 Wilcoxon ranksum test for each ambiguity condition in the motor task). The aggregate choice 29 probabilities and model fits are shown in Fig. SA. This suggests, in line with a previous study 30 [1] , that ambiguity attitude is not sensitive to positive or negative payoff. Aggregate choice probabilities over all subjects in symmetric probe trials of the urn task A and the motor task B, when subjects received point rewards instead of experiencing viscous forces. In the urn task, subjects received one point whenever a red ball was drawn from the urn the subjects selected. No points were awarded if a blue ball was drawn. In the motor task, subjects received one point for hitting the target, otherwise no point was awarded. In both tasks the total point score was shown at all times on the screen. The boxes are centered around the median across subjects and the edges of the box are the 25th and 75th percentiles. Panels C and D show the corresponding model fits. The thin green lines represent individual subjects' choice probabilities according to Equation (4) in the main text, the thick green line indicates the group mean. The dashed lines show the indifference choice probabilities predicted by expected utility. Probabilities above the dashed line imply that subjects prefer the risky choice (ambiguity aversion), probability values below the dashed line imply that subjects prefer the ambiguous choice (ambiguity preference). Asterisks denote significant deviation from the expected utility prediction: one asterisk signifies p < 0.05, two asterisks signify p < 0.01. In the urn task information (%) corresponds to the ratio of the number of revealed balls to the total number of balls, in the motor task to the ratio of visible size to total size of the ambiguous target. One asterisk signifies p < 0.05, two asterisks signify p < 0.01. In the urn task information (%) corresponds to the ratio of the number of revealed balls to the total number of balls, in the motor task to the ratio of visible size to total size of the ambiguous target. In total there were 16 subjects performing the two tasks. Each subject can be identified by their panel position. Error bars indicate standard errors. In the urn task, the decision time was defined as the time from entering the grey start bar to crossing into the orange zone displayed in Fig. 1 of the main text. In the motor task and Experiment 2, the decision time was defined as the time from entering the red square to entering one of the decision circles. Note that the decision time in the urn task was recorded for all 16 subjects, but in the motor task only for the last 8 subjects, and in Experiment 2 for all 25 subjects. The data points show subjects' probability of choosing the risky option in dependence of the amount of information revealed from the ambiguous option. In probe trials, an expected utility decision-maker should always be indifferent between the two options (dashed lines). In 25 subjects, 11 subjects changed from general ambiguity preference in the normal utility condition to a mixed behavior in the inverse utility condition as reflected in the population average shown in the main manuscript. These subjects maintain ambiguity preference for partially ambiguous target bars, but become ambiguity averse in the full ambiguity condition. Six subjects maintained their ambiguity preference across utility conditions in line with the hypothesis that the stimulus induces a stable ambiguity attitude across all ambiguity conditions. Four subjects switched their ambiguity preference across utility conditions in line with a biased belief or perceptual distortion hypothesis. Asterisks on the data points denote a significant deviation from the dashed expected utility line. One asterisk signifies p < 0.05, two asterisks signify p < 0.01. Each open circle corresponds to a subject's choice probability in one of the ambiguity conditions. The different colors indicate the ambiguity condition ranging from cyan, red, green and blue to denote the range from zero ambiguity to full ambiguity. Data points close to the diagonal line imply that the ambiguity preference of subjects remains stable across tasks (as in (A)), data points far from the diagonal line indicate that ambiguity attitudes of subjects changed (as in (B)), thus meaning that Experiment 3 and the motor task induced similar ambiguity attitudes. Filled circles denote the average across individual data points for each ambiguity condition.
